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The Nuclear Alternative:
An Analysis of Paralysis
By J. MICHAEL MCGARRY, mH* and TROY B. CONNER, JR.**

Introduction
Tradition would have us ask, "Who regulates the regulator?'".
Recent developments alter the question with respect to the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC);2 "Does the regulator regulate?"

Due

3
to a combination of court decisions, procedural "due processitis,"
redundant state legislation, and overlapping federal action, the licensing function of the commission has all but come to a complete stand-

still." In like fashion, the mandates of Congress respecting energy de* B.S., 1965, University of Pennsylvania; J.D., 1969, University of Virginia Law
School; member, District of Columbia and Maryland Bars.
** A.B., 1946, University of West Virginia; LL.B., 1948, University of West Virginia College of the Law; member, West Virginia and District of Columbia Bars.
Both authors practice before the NRC. Each represents several electric utilities
which are interested in the development of nuclear power. The authors wish to express
appreciation to Keith Ellis and J. Roy Spradley for their assistance in the preparation
of this article.
1. "But who is to keep watch over the watchers themselves?" ("[S]ed quis custodiet ipsos custodes?") JUVENAL, SATIRE VI, line 347 (c. 120) (J. Lewis transl. 1882).
Cf. PLATO, THE RupuBuc, Bk. 3, § 403E (c. 375 B.C.). See generally Lewis, To Regulate the Regulators, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1959, § 6 (Magazine), at 13; Kramer, The
Place and Function of Judicial Review in the Administrative Process, 28 FORDAM L.
Rnv. 1 (1959); Me Lachin, The NRDC: Watching the Watchdogs, ENERGY DAILY, Aug.
24, 1976, at 103.
2. The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 abolished the Atomic Energy Commision and divided its functions between the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the
regulatory arm, and the Energy Research and Development Agency, the promotional
arm. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-91 (Supp. V, 1975). At the same time, this act left intact
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, ch. 1073, § 1, 68 Stat. 921, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2011-296 (1970), and made it the statutory charter of the newly formed NRC. 42
U.S.C. § 5842 (Supp. V, 1975).
3. Davis, Dueprocessitis in the Atomic Energy Commission, 47 A.B.A.J. 782
(1961).
4. See NUS CORP., ComMERciAL NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS (ed. No. 9, 1977)
(on file with the author).
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velopment generally, and nuclear power development specifically, have
been shelved.
This article considers each of the above negative factors in the
hope that certain positive courses of action will emerge to assist in the
efficient regulation and development of nuclear power. It first describes the NRC's overly cautious reaction to adverse judicial decisions.
It then examines the impact that extremely liberal NRC hearing procedures have on the regulatory process. Third, it considers the role the
preemption doctrine plays with respect to state regulation of matters
germane to federal nuclear licensing and the licensing delays caused
by such regulation. Fourth, it reviews the problems occasioned by the
overlapping jurisdictions of the various federal agencies responsible for
matters relating to nuclear power. Finally, it analyzes congressional
inaction respecting the creation of a national energy policy and its
failure to initiate appropriate energy programs, both of which add to
the dilemma presently facing nuclear power in terms of obtaining licenses within a reasonable time period.
The Decisions and the Administrative Reaction
In hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on
August 27, 1976, NRC Chairman Marcus Rowden stated that he was
concerned about the "lack of guidance" the NRC has received from
Congress and the courts and the attendant "paralysis in decisionmaking" afflicting the agency. 5 Mr. Rowden's remarks were in response to the holdings in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., v.
7
NRC ("Vermont Yankee")6 and Aeschliman v. NRC ("Midland").
While the NRC and its predecessor, the AEC, have enjoyed an enviable judicial track record in all but a limited number of cases, 8 these
two decisions may well be the harbingers of less successful future encounters.
5. Hearings on the Extent and Significance of the Impact on Reactor Licensing
of Two Decisions Issued by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia on July
21, 1976 Before the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., Stenographic

Transcript at 65 (1976).
6. Civil No. 74-1385 (D.C. Cir., July 21, 1976), cert. granted sub nom. Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 45 U.S.L.W.
3554 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1977) (No. 419).
7. Civil No. 73-1776 (D.C. Cir., July 21, 1976), cert. granted sub nom. Consumers Power Co. v. Aeschliman, 45 U.S.L.W. 3554 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1977) (No. 528).
8. See, e.g., Brooks v. AEC, 476 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Scientists' Inst. for
Pub. Information, Inc. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Calvert Cliffs' Coor-

dinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).

May 1977]

THIE NUCLEAR ALTERNATIVE

The Vermont Yankee9 and Midland'0 cases dealt with the
measure of consideration to be given by the NRC to environmental concerns associated with the nuclear reactor phase of the uranium fuel
cycle."' The cases involved commission decisions in both the individual reactor licensing proceedings and the rulemaking proceeding entitled Environmental Effects of the Uranium Fuel Cycle.12 The Natu-

ral Resources Defense Council (NRDC) intervened in both the licensing and rulemaking proceedings and raised the matters advanced

on judicial review.
In the licensing portion of the Vermont Yankee case,'" the NRC
had ruled that the environmental effects of nuclear fuel transportation

to and from nuclear reactors was an appropriate concern of the NRC
but that like consideration need not be given to the environmental im-

pact of the operation of separate reprocessing plants or waste management facilities. The impact of such factors was considered too remote
to the licensing of an operating plant and more appropriately considered
at the time licenses are sought for reprocessing and waste disposal facilities themselves. 1 4 On review the court specifically rejected the commis9. The Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation operates the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Stations pursuant to operating license it received from the commission
on February 28, 1973. 38 Fed. Reg. 6313 (1973). The Natural Resources Defense
Council intervened in the proceeding wherein the operating license was sought, raising,
inter alia, the matters advanced on judicial review. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. v. NRC, Civil No. 74-1385 (D.C. Cir., July 21, 1976), cert. granted sub nom.
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
45 U.S.L.W. 3554 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1977) (No. 419).
10. The Consumers Power Company is constructing the Midland Plant, pursuant
to construction permits issued by the commission on December 5, 1972. 37 Fed. Reg.
28312 (1972). Nelson Aeschliman intervened with others in the proceeding wherein
the construction permits were sought, raising, inter alia, the matters advanced on judicial review. Aeschliman v. NRC, Civil No. 73-1776 (D.C. Cir., July 21, 1976), cert.
granted sub nom. Consumers Power Co. v. Aeschliman, 45 U.S.L.W. 3554 (U.S. Feb.
22, 1977) (No. 528).
The aspects of the Midlands decision which are pertinent to the discussion herein
are controlled by the court's ruling in Vermont Yankee, and accordingly focus will be
placed mainly on the latter case.
11. "The 'nuclear fuel cycle' is that chain of activities beginning with mining of
uranium ore and extending through final reprocessing and disposal of radioactive wastes
by which fuel for a nuclear reactor is processed. Most of these events take place off
the individual reactor site, but are necessary to its continued operation." Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. NRC, Civil No. 74-1385, at 4 n.3 (D.C. Cir., July 21,
1976), cert. granted sub nom. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 45 U.S.L.W. 3554 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1977) (No. 419).
12. 10 C.F.R. § 51.20(e) (Table S-3) (1976).
13. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., 4 A.E.C. 930 (1972).
14. Id. at 931-32.
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sion's logic, holding that "absent effective generic proceedings to consider these issues, they must be dealt with in individual licensing proceedings."'1' 5 The order granting a full term license for the Vermont
Yankee plant was remanded, pending the outcome of the further rulemaking proceedings which were also ordered by the court. 16
In establishing its standards for reviewing license applications for
nuclear power reactors, the commission had decided that while the
environmental effects of the fuel cycle were relatively insignificant, it
was nonetheless desirable to take them into account. 1 7 It was accordingly determined that a series of specified numerical values, intended
to represent the incremental contribution of a hypothetical one thousand
megawatt reactor to the total environmental effect of the uranium fuel
cycle, were to be factored into the cost-benefit anadysis for each reactor.
On review the court found that the commission record from which
these numerical values were derived was incomplete with respect to
reprocessing and waste management matters, and remanded to obtain
a more adequate record."8 In a conclusion apparently directed toward
both the individual licensing and the rulemaking issues, the court
stated:
The Commission's action in cutting off consideration of waste disposal and reprocessing issues in licensing proceedings based on the
cursory development of the facts which occurred in this proceeding
was capricious and arbitrary. The portions of the rule pertaining
to these matters are set aside and remanded. 19
In Midland, the court, reviewing the commission's authorization
to issue construction permits,2" found that the NRC had not properly
considered the impact of energy conservation in its cost-benefit analysis. " As an additional basis for its decision, the court held that the
commission's standards and procedures for consideration of environ22
mental issues relating to the uranium fuel cycle were inadequate,
citing the Vermont Yankee decision issued that same day. The court
15. Civil No. 74-1385, at 12.
16. Id. at 13.
17. Environmental Effects of the Uranium Fuel Cycle, 39 Fed. Reg. 14188, as
amended 10 C.F.R. § 51.20(e) (1976).
18. Civil No. 74-1385, at 38-44.
19. Id. at 44.
20. Aeschliman v. NRC, Civil No. 73-1776, at 4 (D.C. Cir., July 21, 1976),
cert. granted sub nom. Consumers Power Co. v. Aeschliman, 45 U.S.L.W. 3554 (U.S.
Feb. 22, 1977) (No. 528).
21. Id. at 5-16.
22. Id. at 21-22.
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found that the environmental impact statement was incomplete and remanded the matter to the NRC with the order that
the Commission shall undertake appropriate consideration of waste
disposal and other unaddressed fuel cycle issues, and restrike the
cost-benefit
analysis, as necessary, in accordance with NRDC
23
v. NRC.
Clearly left unanswered by these decisions were the questions
whether the environmental effects of reprocessing and waste management facilities should be ascertained in the individual Vermont Yankee
and Midland cases, or await the outcome of the rulemaking proceedings, whether the Vermont Yankee plant may operate and the Midland
plant be constructed while the matter is being resolved, and whether
other nuclear reactor cases in which licenses either have been, or are
about to be, granted, should be reopened to receive evidence of the
environmental effects of reprocessing plants and waste management
where these matters were not specifically considered. One is inclined
to agree with Judge Tamm's concurring statement that he is "distressed
because . . . the majority opinion fails to inform the Commission in
precise terms what it must do in order to comply with the court's ad
24
hoc standard of review."
The administrative reaction to the decisions makes their ambiguity
manifest. On August 13, 1976, the commission issued a responsive
General Statement of Policy,25 directing its staff to produce a revised
environmental survey of the projected environmental costs of the reprocessing and waste management stages of the uranium fuel cycle. 26
The commission also stated that it would reopen its rulemaking proceeding on the environmental effects of the uranium fuel cycle for the
limited purposes of supplementing the record on reprocessing and
waste management issues and determining what changes, if any, in the
current licensing criteria are required.2
With respect to licensing
during the reopened rulemaking proceeding, the commission declared
that "an interim rule might be promulgated as early as December 1976,
providing a basis for licensing at that time."2 In the interim, the com23. Id. at 21.
24. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. NRC, Civil No. 74-1385, Tamm, J.,
concurring at 4 (D.C. Cir., July 21, 1976), cert. granted sub noma. Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 45 U.S.L.W. 3554
(U.S. Feb. 22, 1977) (No. 419).
25. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, General Statement of Policy, 41 Fed. Reg.
34707 (1976).
26. Id. at 34708.
27. Id.

28. Id.
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mission directed that the staff and the licensing boards "continue to
process applications and hold hearings on licensing applications requiring preparation of an environmental3 0 impact statement 29 up to the
point of, but not including, licensing.
On October 13, 1976, the NRC issued the documented environmental survey called for in its General Statement of Policy.3 1 The
commission proposed a revision of the numerical values previously associated with the environmental impact of the nuclear fuel cycle 32 as
an interim substitute for the reprocessing and waste management
values in that portion of the NRC regulation which had been set aside
by the court, 3 indicating that after evaluating comments received in
response to its public notice, it might promulgate a final interim rule
for licensing, pending completion of the reopened uranium fuel cycle
rulemaking proceeding.14 Significantly, the NRC stated that the new
environmental survey could serve as an adequate foundation for such
an interim rule. 5 The new environmental survey did not, however,
specifically address several other issues identified in the General Statement of Policy, including whether the commission sua sponte should
initiate show cause proceedings against present licensees, "6 and
whether interim licenses could be issued in pending cases.
On November 11, 1976, the NRC announced that in view of its
environmental survey it would not initiate reviews of existing licenses,
permits, and authorizations pending the outcome of the remanded rule29. "[S]ome Commission licensing actions do not require preparation of an environmental impact statement, depending upon the circumstances. In these instances,
which may include authorizations for fuel loading, low-power testing, or amending a

construction permit, the Commission's regulations require that an environmental impact
appraisal be undertaken in order to determine whether an environmental impact statement must be prepared. The absence of an effective [generic analysis] would not preclude licensing that is not dependent upon an environmental impact statement. Consequently the Commission is instructing its staff and licensing boards that they may
continue to take such actions where an environmental impact assessment has been made
and has resulted in a determination that no environmental impact statement need be

prepared." Id. (citations omitted).
30. Id.
31. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Environmental Survey of the Reprocessing
and Waste Management Portions of the LWR Fuel Cycle, NUREG-0016 (Supp. I to
Wash-1248), Oct. 13, 1976 (on file at the NRC).
32. See 10 C.F.R. § 51.20(e) (Table S-3) (1976).
33. 41 Fed. Reg. 45849, 45850 (1976).
34. Id. at 45851.
35. Id.
36. See 10 C.F.R. § 2.202 (1976) (procedures to be followed with regard to
show cause orders).
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making proceeding.3 7 The commission also announced that it would
continue to issue full power operating licenses, construction permits, and
limited work authorizations in cases already pending before it, on the
basis of the existing rule, which accounts for reprocessing and waste

management environmental impacts. 8

Such licenses, permits, and

authorizations were to be issued, however, only if additional analysis
is performed to determine whether the cost-benefit balance would remain favorable if the revised reprocessing and waste management values

set forth in the commission's proposed interim rule were used. 39 It
was also recognized that any commission action in this respect would
be conditional upon the court's ultimate approval of its revised environmental analysis of the reprocessing and disposal issues.4 0
On March 14, 1977, the NRC published an effective interim rule

setting forth the revised values for the environmental impacts of the
37. 41 Fed. Reg. 49898 (1976).
38. Id. at 49899.
39. Id.
40. Id.; see Order Granting Stay of Mandate, Oct. 8, 1976, Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. NRC, Civil No. 74-1385 (D.C. Cir., July 21, 1976), cert.
granted sub nom. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 45 U.S.L.W. 3554 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1977) (No. 419).
The NRC based its interim licensing decision on a number of factors: "First, it
would be inappropriate for the Commission to continue to license facilities on the basis
of the existing reprocessing and waste storage values of Table S-3 without taking account
of the approved and expanded analysis now at hand [as the result of the more recent
environmental survey produced in response to the Vermont Yankee and Midland decisions]. Second, that ... analysis is not now reflected in any currently applicable
Commission rule. Third, while continued licensing solely on the basis of the present
Table S-3 values for reprocessing and waste management would be inappropriate, it is
now clear [following the court's October 8, 1976 order staying issuance of the mandate
in the Vermont Yankee case] that the court envisions further licensing; and [the commission believes] that a halt in licensing activity is more likely to have a severe social and
environmental impact than continued licensing on the conditional basis the Court sugFourth, there is no bar to the use of ... the S-3 Table in pending progests ....
ceedings-prior to the adoption of an interim rule-on the basis of individual NEPA
Finally, the Commission
analyses of reprocessing and waste management impacts ....
anticipates that the interim rule as promulgated will closely resemble the proposed rule
published on October 13, and like that proposed rule, will not produce results significantly
different from those obtained under the current rule." 41 Fed. Reg. 49898, 49899
(1976).
As a result of the commission's decision to resume interim licensing, the NRDC
filed a Motion for Clarification on November 29, 1976 asserting that these procedures are
in violation of the stay. Petitioner's Motion for Clarification of the Stay of Mandate,
Nov. 29, 1976, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. NRC, Civil No. 74-1385
(D.C. Cir., July 21, 1976), cert. granted sub nom. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 45 U.S.LW. 3554 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1977) (No.
419).
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41
reprocessing and waste management phases of the uranium fuel cycle.
The interim rule will remain effective for at least eighteen months, and
will terminate upon completion of the reopened rulemaking proceeding
and publication of a final rule. With respect to licenses, permits, and
authorizations issued before Vermont Yankee and Midlands, the NRC
directed that such licenses, permits, and authorizations will remain
effective, since the values in the interim rule are not sufficiently different from the values in the original rule which was relied upon in the
original licensing proceedings. Likewise, the NRC directed that licenses, permits, and authorizations issued after Vermont Yankee and
Midlands would remain in effect for the same reason. With respect to
cases pending before NRC licensing boards in which the evidentiary
record on fuel cycle impact issues has been compiled, the commission
directed that such cases are to be decided on the basis of the existing
record, and that reopening of the record to receive additional testimony
42
is not justified.
The course of action pursued by the NRC in response to Vermont
Yankee and Midland has been consistent with Chairman Rowden's
observation that absent clear judicial direction, the commission has no
choice but to act conservatively, despite the concomitant delay in the
licensing process. 43 In the three and a half months between the
Vermont Yankee and Midland decisions and the commission decision
permitting interim licensing, issuance of construction permits and operating licenses had indeed come to virtually a complete standstill.4 4 The
analysis accompanying the commission's October 13, 1976 announcement4 5 points out that in the absence of an interim rule permitting licensing the start of construction of approximately twenty-three nuclear
units would be delayed a total of 130 months. Furthermore, continued
construction of approximately thirteen nuclear units beyond presently
authorized LWA activities would be delayed 124 months, and 73
months of equivalent full power operating during 1977 would be lost

41. 42 Fed. Reg. 13803 (1977).
42. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Vermont Yankee and Midlands on
February 22, 1977. 45 U.S.L.W. 3554 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1977) (Nos. 419, 528).
43. Hearings on the Extent and Significance of the Impact on Reactors Licensing
of Two Decisions Issued by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia on July
21, 1976 Before the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., Stenographic

Transcript at 65 (1976).
44. NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION, CONSTRUCTION STATUS REPORT
NucLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, OPERATING UNrrS STATUS REPORT (1976).

45.

41 Fed. Reg. 45849 (1976).

(1976);

May 1977]

THE NUCLEAR ALTERNATIVE

1217

at thirteen others.4 6 It is estimated that such delays could give rise to

a three
billion dollar increase in the cost of the production of electricity. 47
Thus, without carefully drawn judicial guidelines, confusion at the
administrative level only results in licensing delay, which in turn exacerbates an already precarious energy picture.

The judiciary must take

a hard look at these far-reaching consequences of decisions in the
of the
energy field and provide more clear-cut guidelines for the use
48
compliance.
of
standards
divine
present
agencies which must at
The NRC's Broad Approach to Regulation
At its inception and for a period of time thereafter, the NRC's
predecessor, the Atomic Energy Commission,49 manifested a generally
expeditious attitude toward nuclear licensing. 50 With time, however,
the commission gave an increasingly broad interpretation to its regulation governing public participation in the licensing process. This
broad interpretation has resulted in much more lenient standards by
which public participation is controlled, the effect of which has been
manifested in licensing delay. 51 The commission has rarely denied a
request to intervene in a proceeding, 52 despite the fact that the courts
46. See OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTORS REGULATION, NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION, IMPACTS OF LATER REVERSING A DECISION TO ADOPT OR NOT TO ADOPT
AN INTERIM RULE PERMITrING CONSTRUCTION OR OPERATION OF NUCLEAR POWER

PLANTS 19-20 (1976).
47. Id. at 4.
48. Recognition must be given to the taxing caseload the federal judiciary is presently bearing, which may very well contribute to the present dilemma of the nuclear
industry. See McGowan, Congress and the Courts, 62 A.B.A.J. 1588, 1590 (1976).
49. See note 2 supra.
50. In 1966, the Senate Subcommittee on the Judiciary, by its Subcommittee on
Administrative Practice and Procedure, undertook an analysis of delay in administrative
procedures. The ensuing report ranked the Atomic Energy Commission as the most
efficient agency. SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, SENATE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89th CONG., 2d SEss., EVALUATION CHARTs ON DELAY IN
ADMNISTRATIVE PRocEEDINGS 13, 76 (Comm. Print 1966). The average proceeding

took only 122 days. Id. The AEC stated that it "expressly recognize[d] the positive
necessity for expediting the decisionmaking process and avoidir-, undue delays." 37
Fed. Reg.15127 (1972).
51. The commission allows "[a]ny person whose interest may be affected by a
proceeding" to file a petition to intervene in that proceeding. 10 C.F.R. § 2.714(a)
(1976).
52. A review of the docket reflects that of the numerous cases that have come
before the commission for review of rulings on intervention since 1972, inonly a limited
number of instances was intervention denied. See, e.g., Kansas Gas & Elec. Co., 2
N.R.C. 740 (1975); Northern States Power Co., I N.R.C. 240 (1975).
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have strictly interpreted the commission's intervention regulation.5 3

Illustrative of this trend in commission practice are its decisions liberalizing its interest requirement. The commission has held, contrary to recognized precedents, that an administrative agency need not be bound
by the federal case law of standing. 54 It has also ruled that good cause
need not necessarily be shown for tardy intervention,5 5 and has refused
to rule on the acceptability of every contention raised at the initial intervention stage, holding that the licensing board must discern only "one
relevant contention . . . set forth with reasonable specificity and with
some basis assigned for it."56 The validity of the remaining contentions
are to be the subject for further (and possibly otherwise unnecessary)
licensing action. 57 In an apparent attempt to eliminate the necessity
of evaluating improper claims at the licensing level, the NRC has developed a summary disposition procedure. 58 To date, however, and de53. In passing upon the commission's intervention regulation, 10 C.F.R. § 2.714(a)
(1972), one circuit court has stated: "Section 189(a) [of the Atomic Energy Act] does
not in literal terms state that any person whose interest is affected may intervene; it
states that such a party shall be granted a hearing upon request and the Commission
shall admit any such person as a party to the proceeding. The statute does not confer
the automatic right of intervention upon anyone. Under its procedural regulations it is
not unreasonable for the Commission to require that the prospective intervenor first
specify the basis for his request for a hearing. . . . The court considers it amenable to
a construction which, when considered with section 161(p) of the Act and the nature
of the intervention, permits the Commission to require the party to inform it of the
issues on which he wishes to be heard, or, as held by the Commission, the contentions to
be advanced and the basis therefor. Section 189(a) does not necessarily preclude a
regulation that the application therefor give contents to the subject matter of the hearing
sought." Business & Prof. People for the Pub. Interest v. AEC, 502 F.2d 424, 428 (D.C.
Cir. 1974).
54. See, e.g., Long Island Lighting Co., 2 N.R.C. 631 (1975).
The commission has recently ruled that judicial cases regarding standing are applicable, but even if these standards are not met the NRC has inherent authority to grant
permissive intervention. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 4 N.R.C. (1976).
55. See, e.g., Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc., I N.R.C. 273 (1975). "mhe burden
of justifying intervenors," however, "is considerably greater where the non-timely petitioner has failed to show such good cause." Id.
56. Northern States Power Co., 6 A.E.C. 188, 194 (1973). The court continued:
"We stress that all we decide now is that . . . the contention is adequate to entitle
[petitioner] to intervene in the proceeding. It remains for him to establish . . . that a
genuine issue actually exists. If the Board is not so satisfied, it may summarily dispose
of the contention on the basis of the pleadings. ...
"The same may be said of the other contentions advanced by [petitioner]. While
there is no need to measure their adequacy as a basis for granting intervention, those
contentions, as well, will appropriately be included in an evidentiary hearing only if
they present a genuine issue, i.e., are not appropriate for summary judgment." Id.
57. Id. See note 56 supra.
58. 10 C.F.R. § 2.749 (1972); see, e.g., Mississippi Power & Light Co., 6 A.E.C.
423, 425 (1973); Northern States Power Co., 6 A.E.C. 188, 194 (1973).

May 19771
May 1977]

T14E NUCLEAR ALTEIRNATIVE1
THE NUCLEAR ALTERNATIVE

spite numerous requests to do so, the commission has rarely utilized this

procedure. 59
The commission has also held out the application of res judicata

and collateral estoppel as means of dispensing with improper claims.
However, while such doctrines- should be particularly pertinent to NRC
licensing by virtue of the two-step NRC hearing process,6" they have
received only cursory treatment.0 ' Matters which were throughly explored at the construction permit stage are presently raised once again

at the operating license stage, 62 and matters that pertain only to con63

struction permit applications are heard at the operating license stage.

Once at the hearing stage, the commission further compromises the
efficiency of the licensing process by permitting intervenors to crossexamine on matters they did not put in issue.6 4

The NRC Appeal

Board has moreover recently ruled that in show cause proceedings an
intervenor proponent of an order does not have the burden of going
forward; the burden is placed on the licensee. 65 The commission regulations, however, make specific reference to the fact that a "proponent
of an order has the burden of proof." 66 Therefore, where the party
59. A review of the NRC Appeals Board docket reflects that of the numerous
motions for summary or partial summary disposition which were filed in only a few
instances were they granted. See, e.g., Toledo Edison Co., 2 N.R.C. 707 (1975); Public
Serv. Co., 1 N.R.C. 513 (1975).
60. See Alabama Power Co., 7 A.E.C. 203 (1974). The commission's regulations
provide for mandatory public hearings at the construction permit application stage and
give the NRC discretion as to whether to hold hearings at the operating license application stage. See 10 C.F.R. §§ 2.104, 50.35 (1975); Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. Electricians, 396 U.S. 367 (1961). Under the terms of the Atomic Energy Act, at the very
least there must be public notice before any licensing application may be granted. 42
U.S.C. § 2232(c) (1970).
61. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co., 3 N.R.C. 1, 5 (1976); Southern Cal. Edison Co., 1 N.R.C. 383, 399 (1975); Duke Power Co., 8 A.E.C. 664, 665 (1974).
62. Duke Power Co., 8 A.E.C. 664 (1974).
63. Id.
64. Northern States Power Co., 1 N.R.C. 1 (1975). The effect of this procedural
decision has been to greatly lengthen the hearing process in many cases. The NRC
Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board pointed out this problem: "The 'surprise'
method of proceeding that had been tolerated in last year's environmental hearings resulted in adjournments and lengthy delays while the NRC Staff and Applicant searched
for knowledgeable witnesses to respond to new areas developed by the State's Attorney
during his cross-examination, beyond the scope otherwise in issue in the proceeding.
Indeed, the Appeal Board's remanded issue of uranium fuel efficiency was first injected
into this proceeding during cross-examination of Applicant's witnesses at the earlier
(1975) environmental hearing, without prior notice to the Board or other parties." Gulf
States Utils. Co., 4 N.R.C. 293, 298 n.9 (1976).
65. Union Elec. Co., 4 N.R.C. 225 (1976).
66. 10 C.F.R. § 2.732 (1976). The commission recognizes that "a show cause
respondent is entitled to know what it is charged with and to be presented with the evi-
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seeking a license is not the proponent of an order, the Appeal Board
position is inconsistent with both administrative law practice and the
Administrative Procedure Act."7
While such procedural rulings may not appear to be individually
significant, in the aggregate they greatly escalate the time required for
license approval. In light of measures anticipated to provide intervenors with the financial and technical assistance, which can only increase the likelihood of intervention,6 8 the commission would be well
advised to replace its present participation requirements with a more
conservative intervention standard. Otherwise, as Professor McFarland has observed:
What passes for a hearing drones on and on, with time consuming
attention to the mere ritual of the situation. . . No federal court
could, or would, function in that fashion. With some notable exceptions, it is the blight of the "administrative process." The administrative hearing was once a reform; now it is too often an
abuse. 69
dence against it before it is called upon to respond with evidence in its own behalf."
Consumers Power.Co., 4 N.R.C. 101, 110 (1976).
67. 5 U.S.C. § 558(c) (1970). "It is a fundamental principle of administrative
proceedings that the burden of proof is on the proponent of a rule or order." Schramm
v. Physical Therapists Examining Bd., 219 A.2d 846 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App., 1966), aff'd,
394 F.2d 972 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert denied, 390 U.S. 987 (1968). See also Trailways
of New England, Inc. v. CAB, 412 F.2d 926 (Ist Cir. 1969). But cf. Day v. National
Transp. Safety Bd., 414 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1969).
68. Two bills introduced by Senator Kennedy, S.1665 and S. 2715, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1975), would have amended the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Administrative Procedure Act, to specifically provide reimbursement for technical assistance and
attorneys fees for intervenors who substantially contribute to a fair determination of the
proceedings. The singling out of the NRC by S.1665, the proposed Public Intervenor's
Assistance Act, is of interest in that the only factors set forth for determination of
eligibility were contribution to the proceeding and ability to pay. S.1665 was referred
to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy where it remained at the close of the Second
Session.
On November 20, 1974, the Atomic Energy Commission issued a memorandum
and order in Consumers Power Co., 8 A.E.C. 820 (1974), dealing with requests for
financial assistance to intervenors in licensing cases. The commission concluded that
substantial policy questions were raised by such requests, which should be explored in
a rule-making proceeding, and commissioned an independent study on the matter. This
study, Policy Issues Raised by Intervenor or Requests for Financial Assistance in NRC
Proceedings, (popularly referred to as the Boasberg Report), was completed on July 18,
1975, and has been made publicly available. See 40 Fed. Reg. 32797 (1975). The
commission thereafter gave notice that it is considering the possibility of amending its
regulations to specify policy respecting request for financial assistance to participants in
commission proceedings. 40 Fed. Reg. 37056 (1975). In the interim, requests for
financial assistance are being deferred.
69. McFarland, Landis' Report: The Voice of One Crying in the Wilderness, 47
VA. L. REv. 373, 431 (1961).

May 1977]

THE NUCLEAR ALTERNATIVE

This is not to say that intervention is unwarranted, for the Atomic
Energy Act expressly provides otherwise; 70 rather, it is submitted that
the NRC should take steps to assure itself that intervention in nuclear
licensing proceedings, which must be viewed as significant major
undertakings, be responsible and limited to specific genuine issues
which have some basis in fact.
State Regulation and the Preemption Doctrine
In addition to the delay inherent in NRC procedure, regulatory
activity is being used as a mechanism for state involvement in areas
which have been preempted by the Atomic Energy Act.7 1 The result
of such state activity, which often parallels NRC proceedings in terms
of both subject of inquiry and time frame, 72 has further impeded
nuclear licensing. In more than one instance, NRC licensing has been
held in abeyance pending the resolution of proceedings at the state
level."s
Redundant state participation in nuclear licensing decisions necessarily stems from inconsistent application of the preemption doctrine. 74 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held
in Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota" that Congress, "acting
within its constitutionally delegated authority, ' 70 had manifested its intent to preempt the regulation of the construction and operation of
nuclear reactors by virtue of both the language and legislative history
70. 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a) (1970).
71. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-296 (1970 & Supp. V, 1975).
72. See Power Authority of N.Y., Joint Hearing Protocol, 41 Fed. Reg. 49900
(1976); Haggard, Site Acceptability and Power Availability-Needed Institutional
Changes, 25 NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY 607 (1975).

73. In one recent case the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board held construction
permit proceedings in abeyance pending the completion of a state authorized need for
power survey and state resolution of a consumptive water use concern. This decision
was made despite the fact that need forpower and consumptive water use were thoroughly assessed by the applicant and the NRC staff and were the subject of two weeks of
public hearings before the licensing board. Order Staying Construction Permit Proceedings, Duke Power Co., Nos. STN 50-488, 50-489, 50-490 (NRC, Apr. 15, 1976). See
also Southern Cal. Edison Co., 7 A.E.C. 37 (1974).
74. The doctrine of federal preemption, based on the supremacy clause of the
U.S. Constitution, operates to foreclose state action in a particular area where there
exists a conflict between federal and state regulations such that compliance with both
is an impossibility or where Congress has manifested its intent wholly to occupy a field,
to the exclusion of the states. This intent may be either express or implied. U.S.
CoNsr. art. VI, § 2; City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624
(1973); Teamsters Local 20 v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252 (1964).
75. 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), affd, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
76. Id. at 1147.
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of the Atomic Energy Act and "the pervasiveness of the federal regulatory scheme.""7 The court held that at least with respect to radiological matters, "the federal government has exclusive authority under
the doctrine of pre-emption to regulate the construction and operation
of nuclear power plants."7 8 Certain matters germane to NRC licensing,
however, are traditional areas of state control, including, inter alia,
rate setting, condemnation, water allocation, and site approval. State
powers in these nonradiological matters clearly are not preempted by
the Atomic Energy Act.79
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,80 however, as
interpreted by the District of Columbia Circuit in Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. AEC,8 requires the commission also to
consider nonradiological environmental issues in licensing proceedings:
NEPA, first of all, makes environmental protection a part of the
mandate of every federal agency and department. The Atomic
Energy Commission, for example, had continually asserted, prior
to NEPA, that it had no statutory authority to concern itself with
the adverse environmental effects of its actions. Now, however,
its hands are no longer tied. It is not only permitted, but compelled, to take environmental values into account. Perhaps the
greatest importance of NEPA is to require the Atomic Energy
issues
Commission and other agencies to consider environmental
2
just as they consider other matters within their mandates .
Unlike the Atomic Energy Act, the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA) expressly disavows preemption and declares its policy to
be that of the federal government "in cooperation with State and local
governments. ' 3 Indeed, the court in Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc. v. Armstrong,8 4 held that "NEPA commands a harmonization of
77. Id. at 1152-53
78. Id. at 1154.
79. The act provides for general nonradiological authority as follows: "Nothing
in this section shall be construed to affect the authority of any State or local agency
to regulate activities for purposes other than protection against radiation hazards."
The act also provides that "[nloth(Emphasis added) 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) (1970).
ing in [the act] shall be construed to affect the authority or regulations of any Federal,
State, or local agency with respect to the generation, sale, or transmission of electric
power produced through the use of nuclear facilities licensed by the Commission:
Provided, That this section shall not be deemed to confer upon any Federal, State, or
local agency any authority to regulate, control, or restrict any activities of the Commission." Id. § 2018.
80. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
81. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
82. Id. at 1112 (footnote omitted).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1970).
84. 352 F. Supp. 50 (N.D. Cal. 1972), afl'd, 487 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 974 (1974).
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state and Federal agency action," and noted that the California Water
Resources Control Board "has the power to take several steps which
clearly would affect Federal appropriation permit applications."' 5
It is thus apparent that a grey area exists with respect to permissible and nonpermissible action on the state level by virtue of the doctrine of preemption. Conflicts inevitably arise when a state invokes
its jurisdiction over an activity which is not expressly preempted by
federal authority, but nonetheless affects a policy goal in the preempted
area. Thus,
[i]f a local government excludes a nuclear power plant from an
industrial zone where conventional power plants are permitted on
the ground that nuclear power reactors require a large site for an
'exclusion area' which lowers the potential assessed value and reduces the number of jobs available through more intense industrial
development, it would be a difficult matter to determine if the exclusion xests on this formal purpose or on a concern about radiation
hazards. There is also the complex issue whether such local regulation raises a sufficient degree of conflict with the federal statute
so as to be invalidated under the doctrine of implied preemption. 81
Should such a conflict occur, where compliance with both federal
and state law is impossible, the supremacy clause, of course, is triggered
and the state legislation preempted. Such was the case for example
in State Department of Environmental Protection v. Jersey Central
Power & Light Co.,8 7 where the court held that federal regulations necessarily preempted those of the state when compliance was impossible
with both commission radiological requirements governing the dilution
of atomic waste on the one hand and state environmental statutes prohibiting certain cold water discharges on the other. The claim for violation of the state statute was accordingly disallowed.
The underlying rationale for federal supremacy in such circumstances is perhaps best articulated in Northern States Power Co. v.
Minnesota,88 in which the court expounded the need for a comprehensive national scheme capable of balancing conflicting values:
Thus, through direction of -thelicensing scheme for nuclear reactors,
Congress vested the AEC with the authority to resolve the proper
balance between desired industrial progress and adequate health and
safety standards. Only through the application and enforcement of
85. 352 F. Supp. at 58.
86. Murphy & LaPierre, Nuclear "Moratorium" Legislation in the States and the
Supremacy Clause: A Case of Express Pre-Emption, ATOMIC INDUS. FORUM 95 (1975).
For an example of existing legislation which enters into the "grey area" see Cal. Stat.
1976, ch. 194, at _; id. ch. 195, at _; id. ch. 196, at
.
87. 69 N.J. 102, 351 A.2d 337 (1976).
88. 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971).
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uniform standards promulgated by a national agency will these
dual objectives be assured. Were the states allowed to impose
stricter standards on the level of radioactive waste releases discharged from nuclear power plants, they might conceivably be so
overprotective in the area of health and safety as to unnecessarily
stultify the industrial development and use of atomic energy for the
production of electric power. 89
Any state regulation citing purposes which fall within nonpreempted areas nonetheless germane to nuclear facility licensing should
be preempted if its purpose of effect is to interfere unduly with the
objectives of congressional atomic energy legislation. These objectives
include both protection of the public from radiation hazards and promotional activity. 0 It is submitted that where delay in the nuclear administrative process could arise by virtue of state action, the state proceedings must give way to federal process. 9 1
The Jurisdictional Dilemma of the Federal Agencies
The delay inherent in intra-agency and state-federal regulatory
conflicts over siting and licensing is further compounded by jurisdictional conflicts among several federal agencies, each of which regulates,
under separate statutory authority, a discrete aspect of the construction
and operation of nuclear facilities. It is at this federal interagency level
that the dilatory effect of overlapping jurisdictional authority is perhaps
most fully manifest.
The court in Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v.
92
AEC interpreted NEPA93 to require the NRC fully to evaluate all
environmental issues. Specifically, it ruled that the commission could
no longer accept the findings of other agencies that a given facility
would not have significant adverse environmental impact. Rather, the
commission would be required henceforth to fully assess all environ89. Id. at 1153-54. The need for an exclusive regulatory scheme as set forth in
Northern States was recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Train v. Colorado
Pub. Interest Research Group, 96 S. Ct. 1938 (1976), in which pollutants subject to
regulation under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act were held not to include certain nuclear materials within the regulatory scheme created by the Atomic Energy Act,
such material being therefore beyond regulation by state permit programs.
90. Note, Application of the Preemption Doctrine to State Laws Affecting Nuclear
Power Plants, 62 VA. L. REv. 738 (1976).
91. See generally City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624
(1973); Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 102-04 (1962); Clover
Leaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 167 (1942).
92. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
93. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970 & Supp. V, 1975).
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mental costs in order to ascertain for itself that they are sufficiently
counterbalanced by the benefits which the facility provides. 94
It is in this context, then, that other federal agencies have the au-

thority to regulate discrete parts of the whole of any given nuclear project. The federal agency having perhaps the most significant overlap
with the commission's nuclear energy facility licensing activities is the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 95 To a lesser extent, the

Army Corps of Engineers,90 the Department of Commerce, 97 and the
94. 449 F.2d at 1112. See text accompanying note 82 supra.
95. The Environmental Protection Agency is authorized under the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), to regulate or supervise the regulation of virtually all
aspects of water quality including the following: water quality criteria and standards,
guidelines for discharge effluent limitations, permits regulating the discharge of pollutants,
and long range water quality management plans. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. V,
1975).
96. The Army Corps of Engineers is authorized to regulate the discharge of
refuse affecting navigability and the discharge of dredged or fill materials. 33 U.S.C.
§ 407 (1970); id. § 1344 (Supp. V, 1975). Every nuclear power plant inevitably requires a corps permit, either for the construction of its cooling water intake structure
or for some other dredge and fill activity which must be conducted during its construction.
Steam electric power plants require cooling water, and the vast preponderance of
cooling water intake structures are located in navigable water, as defined in the FWPCA,
and their construction necessarily involves some dredge and fill activity. Even facilities
not located on navigable waters may nonetheless require a corps permit because of
construction occurring in wetlands.
The NRC, in fulfillment of its NEPA responsibilities, assesses the environmental
impact of intake structures and has attempted to coordinate its activities in this regard
with those of the corps. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding Between the Corps
of Engineers, United States Army, and the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
for Regulation of Nuclear Power Plants, 40 Fed. Reg. 37110 (1975). The most
common areas of disagreement are those of intake location and velocity. Most frequently these differences are resolved, and while they generally do not preclude construction of the facility, they necessarily prolong and complicate the licensing period.
As with the EPA, there is presently no requirement that the intake standards imposed
by the corps be compatible with those of the NRC. If the two standards cannot be
coordinated, plant construction will be delayed or barred, because there is no clear
administrative means of resolving the "conflict of experts."
97. The Department of Commerce is authorized under the Coastal Zone Management Act to monitor the development and implementation of state coastal zone management plans. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64 (Supp. V, 1975). Once approved, these coastal
zone management plans require that any facility which either is located in the coastal
zone or significantly affects land or water use therein be certified as being consistent
with the plan. Facilities not so certified may not be constructed. The NRC likewise
assesses site acceptability, and while the potential conflict inherent in this dual jurisdictional charter has yet to be judicially addressed, it is apparent that yet another
source of licensing delay is on the administrative horizon.
For example, proposed nuclear power facilities will be evaluated by the states and
a determination made as to the facilities' compatibility with the coastal zone management plan. No such evaluation has yet been made, and the scope and effect of these
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Department of Interior9 8 also interact with nuclear licensing activities. 9
The NRC must include the conclusions of these agencies in its own
decisionmaking process. In those instances in which any one agency
either fails to act expeditiously, attempts to extend its authority to cover
the nuclear facility in toto, or otherwise infringes upon NRC jurisdiction, however, the licensing process necessarily breaks down.
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), 1°° for example, granted the EPA broad authority to regulate the discharge of
pollutants into virtually all waters of the United States'' through the
evaluations remains uncertain; however, it is clear that any such evaluation would necessarily overlap present evaluations of the EPA and the NRC. It is conceivable that a
facility in full compliance with AEA, FWPCA, and NEPA may nonetheless be arbitrarily precluded from being located in the coastal zone after a negative Commerce Department evaluation.
98. The Department of the Interior is charged with the protection of endangered
or threatened species and their critical habitats, and the conservation of wildlife resources.
16 U.S.C. §§ 661-68ee, 1531-43 (1970 & Supp. V, 1975); Federal Land Policy & Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743. Prior to the issuing of permits,
the NRC is required to consult with the Interior Department regarding any impact to
wildlife resources which might result from the construction or operation of a proposed
facility. The commission must then take any action necessary, including the qualification
or denial of a permit, to insure that neither the construction nor the operation of a
facility will threaten such species or habitats. While Interior Department approval is
not expressly required, before the NRC can act, the practical effect of conditioning an
NRC license on the department's findings and recommendations is clearly the same.
In one case a Florida company was ordered by the NRC to take special action to prevent disruption of green turtle nesting. Florida Power & Light Co., 1 N.R.C. 101, 144
(1975).
The Department of the Interior has designated critical habitats for the American
crocodile, California condor, Indiana bat, and Florida manatee. 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.61-.66
(1976).
Pursuant to the Endangered Species Act, all federal agencies must take "such
action as is necessary to insure that actions authorized, funded, or carried out by them"
do not result in the destruction or modification of these critical habitats. 16 U.S.C.
§ 1536 (Supp. V, 1975). The Interior Department has developed guidelines to assist
federal agencies in complying with the act which interpret "modification" to mean
"adverse modification." The impact of these and other designations of critical habitats
on nuclear plant siting is at this time uncertain. Compare National Wildlife Fed'n
v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3397 (1976) (sandhill
crane), with Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 534 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir. 1976) (Indiana bat).
Interestingly, the Seventh Circuit held that the NRC has jurisdiction to approve a
nuclear power plant site that may affect an adjacent national park under the jurisdiction
of the Interior Department. Itzak Walton League of America, Inc. v. AEC, 533 F.2d
1011 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 366 (1976).
99. The Energy Research and Development Administration interacts with the NRC
in areas other than licensing proceedings. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-91 (Supp. V, 1975). See
notes 147-49 infra.
100. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. V, 1975).
101. This strict prohibition against the unauthorized discharge of pollutants, together with the broad definition of the terms pollutant, discharge, and navigable waters
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establishment of a national discharge elimination permit system. 10 2 In
regulating nuclear power plants, FWPCA required the EPA to establish effluent limitations, 10 3 to minimize the adverse environmental impact of cooling water intake structures,1 04 and to oversee the development and enforcement of state water quality standards and water

quality management plans. 0 5 Prior to the FWPCA, the AEC ap-

proyed the overall cooling system for each power plant it licensed, some

of which utilized once-through cooling systems.106 In promulgating
contained therein, grant the EPA virtually limitless authority to regulate the discharge
of pollutants into all waters of the United States. 33 U.S.C. § 1311, 1362 (Supp. V,
1975).
102. The FWPCA established the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
as the sole mechanism through which the discharge of pollutants into waters of the
United States may be authorized. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (Supp. V, 1975). The act also
requires every applicant for a federal license or permit authorizing the construction or
operation of facilities which may result in a discharge into navigable waters to obtain
state certification that such discharge will comply with 33 U.S.C. § 301-02, 306-07
(Supp. V, 1975). Id. § 1341.
103. The EPA must promulgate "guidelines" to be used to establish "effluent limitations" to be applied to discharges, through discharge elimination system permits, according to the following schedule: (1) by July 1, 1977, effluent limitations requiring
"application of the best practicable control technology current available"; or (2) any
more stringent limitations required to meet water quality standards; and, (3) by July
1, 1983, effluent limitations requiring "application of the best available technology
economically achievable." 33 U.S.C. H9 1311, 1314 (Supp. V, 1975). The act also
requires that "new sources" meet effluent limitations representing the "best available
demonstrated control technology." Id. § 1316.
With regard to the discharge of heat, FWPCA allows the discharge elimination
system permitting authority to establish an alternative effluent limitation where those
established elsewhere under the FWPCA are shown to be "more stringent than necessary to assure the protection and propagation of a balanced, indigenous population of
shellfish, fish, and wildlife in and on the body of water into which the discharge is to
be made." Id. § 1326(a).
104. "Mhe location, design, construction, and capacity of cooling water intake
structures [must] reflect the best technology available for minimizing adverse environmental impact." Id. § 1326(b).
105. The EPA must publish criteria for water quality to be utilized by states in
the development of water quality standards. Id. § 1313(b). Once approved by EPA,
these standards are enforced under Section 301 of the act. Id. § 13 11(b) (1) (c). The
states are required to review and revise, as appropriate, their water quality standards
at least once every three years, and to have a "continuing planning process" for water
quality management. Id. 99 1313(c), (e). The EPA is also directed to publish guidelines under which states are to develop "areawide -waste treatment management plans."
Id. § 1288.
106. See, e.g., Omaha Pub. Power Dist., 6 A.E.C. 591, 596-99 (1973); Duke
Power Co., 6 A.E.C. 92, 118-21 (1973).
A once-through cooling system is one which draws water from a natural source,
uses it to cool the condensers in a steam electric power system and returns it to a natural
body of water. A closed cycle cooling system passes water through the condensers, then
through an artificial cooling device, such as a cooling tower, and continues to recycle
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FWPCA effluent limits10 7 the EPA required the retrofit of closed cycle
cooling systems on certain of these NRC approved facilities' 018 and

thereby effectively outlawed cooling systems previously approved
under NEPA. 00 The fate of these facilities still remains uncertain.
Prior to FWPCA the NRC had likewise independently examined
the environmental impact of intake structures as part of its NEPA responsibility under Calvert Cliffs' and established standards regarding

such structures. 110 Section 316(b) of the FWPCA, however, authorizes the EPA to require that the location, design, construction, and ca-

pacity of such structures reflect "the best technology available for mini-

mizing adverse environmental impact.""'

The EPA interprets this

section as permitting it to require closed-cycle cooling systems despite
the fact that a closed-cycle system is not necessary to insure that discharges of cooling water meet applicable EPA or state thermal water
quality standards and limitations." 2 But so postured, the EPA has the
basically the same water. It should be noted that a small portion of the cooling water
evaporates during a cycle and a corresponding amount of water is added to the cycle
to offset this loss.
107. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 423.10-.46 (1976).
108. In 1974 the chairman of the AEC advised the EPA administrator that the
commission had approved some 132 final environmental impact statements for nuclear
power plants, 70 of which utilize open cycle cooling systems. Of these, 55 would be
required under the EPA's regulations to backfit closed cycle cooling systems. It was
requested that the EPA establish a special class within the EPA regulations for NEPAapproved nuclear power plants. No such class has been created. Letter from Dixie Lee
Ray to Russell Train, Sept. 30, 1974, cited in Appalachian Power Co. v. Train (I), 545
F.2d 1351, 1367 (4th Cir. 1976).
109. The EPA Effluent Limitation Guidelines identified closed cycle cooling as
the best available technology for the control of the discharge of heat from "generating
units" and required its imposition by July 1, 1981. 40 C.F.R. §§ 423.10-.46 (1976).
Hence, certain of the plants approved by the NRC under NEPA, utilizing once-through
cooling will become "illegal" discharges after that date. Id. § 423.13(b). When the
issue of retrofitting closed cycle cooling at NEPA was approved, non-closed-cycle cooling
of nuclear power plants was taken up before the Fourth Circuit as a part of the electric
utility industry's appeal of the EPA effluent limitation guidelines, the regulations in
question were remanded by the court, and the EPA was instructed to consider whether
a special category for "[NEPA] approved nuclear plants" should be created. Appalachian Power Co. v. Train (I), 545 F.2d 1351, 1378 (4th Cir. 1976). The matter has
yet to be resolved, although the EPA now anticipates proposing revised effluent limitation guidelines in March 1978.
110. See, e.g., Toledo Edison Co., 2 N.R.C. 993, 1004-05 (1975); Georgia Power
Co., 7 A.E.C. 895, 906-07 (1974); Florida Power & Light Co., 7 A.E.C. 249, 255, 257,
259-60 (1974).
111. 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (Supp. V, 1975). The EPA "best technology" determination regarding the intake is implemented as a condition of the discharge permit
required under 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (Supp. V, 1975).
112. Although FWPCA does not authorize the agency to directly specify any particular mode of cooling, the power to impose environmental restrictions on intake capacity
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power to reverse numerous NRC decisions in the area. 113

It appears

incongruous at best -to have one agency condition its approval upon one
set of environmental criteria while another, under a separate mandate,
establishes different and perhaps incompatible standards. Such a situation breaks down the entire licensing process.
A clear example of the above described incongruity is seen in
Public Service Company of New Hampshire's applications before NRC

and EPA for its Seabrook nuclear station. The plant, as designed, contemplates the use of once-through cooling. Indeed, the Initial Decision
of the NRC, rendered on June 29, 1976, approved the utilization of

such a system."14 On November 9, 1976, the EPA regional administrator concluded that his earlier determinations sanctioning the use

of once-through cooling at the Seabrook site were in error." 5 The
regional administrator indicated, however, that he was not now de-

ciding whether a closed cycle cooling system (i.e., cooling towers) was
required but rather was reinstituting hearings to resolve this matter." 6
On January 21, 1977, the NRC appeal board reversed its licensing
board and directed it to conduct with all due expedition further pro-

ceedings related to the use of the Seabrook site with cooling towers
and suspended the previously issued construction permits effective
February 4, 1977."11 On January 24, 1977, the NRC stayed the effectiveness of the appeal board order so as to permit deliberation and oral
argument before the commission in mid-February.Y"
To date, the
carries with it the effective ability to render any once-through cooling system unfeasable..
See Memorandum from Ray McDevitt, EPA Associate General Counsel to EPA Acting
Assistant Administrator for Enforcement, Feb. 14, 1975. The electric utility industry
has appealed the EPA regulations which implement this policy in Appalachian Power
v. Train (II), Civil No. 76-1474 (4th Cir., filed Apr. 27, 1976). The FWPCA provides
for direct appeal to the Circuit court, but only indirectly, in cases involving this section,
33 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (Supp. V, 1975). Since it relates to effluent limitations, § 1326
(b) is covered by, although not mentioned specifically in, 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b) (Supp.
V, 1975). The court has yet to give an opinion as to whether it has exclusive jurisdiction over this subject matter.
113. See Letter from Robert V. Zenner, EPA General Counsel, to Representative
Barry M. Goldwater, Jr., Apr. 21, 1976, which identified two nuclear power plants,
Indian Point and Brunswick Stations, at which the EPA has already ordered the retrofit
of closed cycle cooling as a remedy to intake impacts.
114. Public Serv. Co., No. LBP-76-26, at 857, 926-29 (NRC, June 29, 1976) (decision of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board).
115. See Public Serv. Co., Nos. 50-443, 50-444, at 9-10 (NRC, filed Jan. 21,1977)
(decision of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 69-71.
118. Public Serv. Co., Nos. 50-443, 50-444 (NRC, filed Jan. 24, 1977) (commission
order announcing decision to review Appeals Board ruling, under 10 C.F.R. § 2.786
(1976)).
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future of the Seabrook plant is totally speculative. The dilemma the
applicant of the facility presently finds itself in has arisen solely because of the conflicting jurisdictions of the NRC and EPA.
The commission has decided to allow limited excavation activities
of the Seabrook site, pending its decision on the appeal." 9 In the interim, however, the order suspending construction permits has been
12
continued.
Another instance of EPA-NRC jurisdictional overlap arises in the
area of water quality standards and water quality management plans.
Under the FWPCA, the states are charged with the primary responsibility for establishing water quality standards,' 2 ' and upon EPA approval, principal enforcement authority inures to the state.' 2 2 For
FWPCA purposes, the water quality control standard ceases to be sub123
ject to intergovernmental challenge once the EPA approval is given.
The NRC, on the other hand, by virtue of its NEPA responsibility to
assess water quality as part of its cost-benefit analysis,1 24 has nonetheless
raised water quality issues in several proceedings despite outstanding
certification that the facility complies with all applicable water quality
standards.' 25 The result of this conflict has been redundant regulatory
1 26
review and attendant delays.
Associated with this jurisdictional overlap is the dilemma caused
by the FWPCA's requirement for the development of statewide water
quality management plans. 27 The EPA regulations implementing this
119. Public Serv. Co., Nos. 50-443, 50-444 (NRC, filed Feb. 7, 1977).
120. Id.
121. 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (Supp.V, 1975).
122. Id. § 1341.
123. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1341(a), 1371(c) (Supp. V, 1975); 38 Fed. Reg. 2679
(1973); 40 Fed. Reg. 60115 (1975); cf. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 2 N.R.C. 271,

301 (1975).
124.

See Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1123-25

(D.C. Cir. 1971).
125. For example, the matter of compliance with South Carolina state water quality
standards was the subject of two days of hearings in Duke Power Co., Nos. STN 50-488,
50-489, 50-490 (NRC, Apr. 15, 1976).
126. It is hoped that on post FWPCA nuclear plants the NRC-EPA memorandum

of understanding will resolve this conflict. See 40 Fed. Reg. 60115 (1975).
127. The act requires states to develop a continuing planning process for water
quality management and area-wide waste treatment management plans. 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1288, 1313(c) (Supp. V, 1975). The EPA regulations implementing these sections
require the preparation of a statewide water quality management plan. See 40 C.F.R.
§§ 130.1-31.23 (1976). The scope of these plans has been expanded by the court to

include all areas of each state. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 396
F. Supp. 1386, 1390-91 (D.D.C.), appeal docketed, No. 75-1873, D.C. Cir., Aug. 4,

1975,
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plan require that each state water quality management plan include a
provision governing the "anti-degradation of water quality," although
FWPCA itself contains no such directive. 128 Once a water quality
management plan is approved, the EPA is prohibited from authorizing
any discharge violating plan standards, notwithstanding the fact that the
discharger may have utilized the best available technology to control the
discharge of pollutants.' 29 Because no permit may be issued "in conflict" with these plans, and because they must prevent water quality degradation, no NRC license may be issued to a facility causing degradation of water quality unless, as the EPA regulations provide, the
degradation is determined to be the result of "necessary and justifiable
economic or social development."' 3 0 While no water quality management plan has yet been approved by EPA, the prospect of retrofitting
requirements and delay is ominous.''
The EPA-NRC conflict over regulation of radioactive effluents received perhaps its greatest test in the case of Train v. Colorado Public
Interest Research Group" 2 (CPIRG), in which CPIRG alleged that
the FWPCA required the EPA to regulate all discharges of radioactive
materials into navigable waters.' 3 While on its face the FWPCA does
indeed require the EPA to regulate the discharge of all pollutants, its
legislative history makes it quite clear that Congress did not in fact
intend to authorize the EPA to regulate the discharge of source, byproduct, and special nuclear materials.' 3 4 The Supreme Court accordingly held that the preemptive regulatory authority over these
radioactive substances granted the commission under the Atomic
128. Federal regulations require each state to adopt a statewide antidegradation
policy to protect in-stream uses from further degradation, prevent degradation of high
quality waters unless as a result of necessary and justifiable economic or social development, and prevent any degradation in high quality waters which constitute a national
resource.

40 C.F.R. § 130.17(e) (1976).

The electric utility industry has challenged

these regulations, seeking to expunge the antidegradation provision.

Commonwealth

Edison Co. v. Train, Civil No. 75-C-4127 (E.D. Ill., filed Dec. 5, 1975).

Should this

effort fail, however, these water quality management plans will necessarily create new
and, perhaps, substantially different effluent limitations for nuclear power plants.
129. The EPA may not issue a permit under 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (Supp. V, 1975),
to any discharge "in conflict with" an approved plan. 40 C.F.R. § 130.32 (1976). This
rule subordinates the effluent limitations established under 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1316
(Supp. V, 1975) to those of the water quality management plan.
130. 40 C.F.R. § 130.17(e) (1976).

131.

The provisions of these plans will be applied to a nuclear power plant through

the modification of its discharge elimination system permit, which must be renewed
every five years. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (b)(1)(B) (Supp. V, 1975).
132. 96 S. Ct. 1938 (1976). See note 89 supra.
133. 96 S.Ct. at 1939-40.
134. Id. at 1943-48.
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Energy Act was not affected by the FWPCA and that the EPA was
neither permitted nor required to regulate the discharge of source, byproduct, or special nuclear materials. 13 5
Unfortunately, the conflict over radiological regulation does not
end with Train v. CPIRG. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970,138
which created the EPA, transferred to it both the responsibilities of the
Federal Radiation Council and certain functions previously under the
aegis of the NRC to establish "generally applicable environmental
standards for the protection of the general environment from radioactive material."' 3 7 On the basis of this authority, the EPA published
proposed environmental standards for the uranium fuel cycle' 38 which
establish both maximum allowable annual levels of exposure to radiation and maximum limits on the total quantity of radioactive materials
entering the environment. 3 9
Although the proposed regulations do not conflict with the "as
low as is reasonably achievable" radiation emission design objectives
promulgated by the NRC, 4 ° they nonetheless clearly overlap the commission's regulations. Because no final regulations have yet been
promulgated, the full extent of the conflict created by this jurisdictional
overlap is presently indeterminable. However, if the EPA's final regulations are not identical to the NRC standards, implementation of the
regulations is certain to cause measurable regulatory lag. If, on the
other hand, the regulations are identical to the NRC's, they are redundant and wholly unnecessary.
The NRC and EPA have attempted to resolve their jurisdictional
conflicts. The product of this effort, which has encompassed more
than three years of interagency negotiations, was the NRC-EPA Second
Memorandum of Understanding and Policy Statement.' 4 ' Pursuant to
the memorandum, and in order to avoid duplication of effort, the NRC
and the EPA are to consolidate and coordinate their efforts with respect
to the regulation of the quality of the water to the maximum extent
practicable. The EPA and the states have pledged, moreover, to make
135. Id. at 1948-49.
136. 3 C.F.R. § 1072 (1966-1970). The plan became effective on July 1,1970.
137. Id. at 1073.
138. 40 Fed. Reg. 23420 (1975). The EPA has also published, under this same
authority, an advance notice of proposed rulemaking involving proposed rules on environmental radiation protection standards for high-level radioactive waste, 41 Fed. Reg.
53363 (1976).
139. 40 Fed. Reg. 23419 (1975).
140. 10 C.F.R. § 50, App. 1 (1976).
141. 40 Fed. Reg.60115 (1975).

May 1977]

THE NUCLEAR ALTERNATIVE

1233

initial determinations as early as possible in the licensing process; the
NRC, in turn has pledged to accept EPA and state water quality determinations on post-FWPCA license applications. Furthermore, where
a particular site or discharge technology is authorized in a water quality
management plan, the memorandum stipulates that the NRC will not
consider alternatives.
Both the EPA and the NRC have reserved, however, the right to
object to each other's views. Where such differences exist, the EPA
may petition for leave to intervene in the NRC license proceeding.
Additionally, when evaluating the costs and benefits of a proposed
facility pursuant to NEPA, the NRC also evaluates impact on water
quality, despite the fact that such impacts are subject to other requirements promulgated pursuant to FWPCA.
While the memorandum of understanding is intended to assist in
the task of sorting out many of the conflicts discussed above,1 4 2 its salutary effect has yet to be observed in nuclear licensing proceedings.
Until such time as the jurisdictional overlap between the EPA and the
NRC is congressionally eliminated by placing exclusive jurisdiction over
water quality in one agency, delay in the form of redundant proceedings and retrofitting activities will continue to result.
Congress and the National Nuclear Energy Policy
Coupled with the foregoing paralyzing factors is an apparent lack
of administrative and judicial recognition of the nation's energy policy
and the role nuclear power plays in that policy. 143 This of course stems
in large part from the lack of a clear congressional mandate for a
unified and comprehensive national energy policy. There is, however,
a fairly recognizable national policy, and mechanisms and programs
exist to effectuate it. This policy, however, is source-defined and
therefore in piecemeal condition. Programs are un-coordinated and
often in conflict.
142. Id. at 60116-18. See notes 95-140 & accompanying text supra.
143. See, e.g., Appalachian Power Co. v. Train (I), 545 F.2d 1351 (4th Cir. 1976);
Natural Resources Defense Council v. NRC, Civil No. 74-1385 (D.C. Cir., July 21,
1976), cert. granted sub nom. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 45 U.S.L.W. 3554 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1977) (No. 419);
Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Information v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Hearings
on the Extent and Significance of the Impact on Reactor Licensing of Two Decisions
Issued by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia on July 21, 1976 Before
the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., Apr. 27, 1976, stenographic
transcript at 63-65. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, General Statement of Policy, 41
Fed. Reg. 34707 (1976).
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Official United States policy with respect to atomic energy is set
forth in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which provides that "the development, use, and control of atomic energy shall be directed so as
to make the maximum contribution to the general welfare. . ..
144 To
this end the Atomic Energy Commission was established. It was given
both promotional and regulatory functions respecting the development,
use, and control of atomic energy. It stood as the perfect example of
a source-defined energy agency, having been given all-encompassing
responsibility for a single energy source.
Congress has apparently recognized, within the last few years, the
need for the formulation of a comprehensive energy policy. Toward
that end, the Federal Energy Administration (FEA) was created in
1974.145 Part of the function of this agency was to
advise the president and the Congress with respect to the establishment of a comprehensive national energy policy in relation to
the energy matters for which the Administration has responsibility,
and, in coordination with the Secretary of State, the integration of
domestic
and foreign policies relating to energy resource manage146
ment.
In that same year Congress passed the Energy Reorganization
Act, creating the Energy Resource Council and replacing the Atomic
Energy Commission with two independent agencies, the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA), and the NRC. 4 8
The ERDA was established, in part, to "assure the coordinated and
effective development of all energy sources.'1 4 . Under its aegis, nuclear
energy research and development programs were incorporated into a
comprehensive scheme for the development of all energy resources.
At least in the areas of research and development, therefore, a national
energy program has been promulgated in which nuclear energy plays
a recognized part.'5 0
1 47

144. 42 U.S.C. § 2011(a) (1970). The underlying rationale of this national nuclear energy policy and the programs required to effectuate it is set forth in 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2012-13 (1970).
145. 15 U.S.C. §§ 761-86 (Supp. V, 1975).
146. Id.§ 764(b)(1).
147. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-91 (Supp. V, 1975).
148. Id. §§ 2011-296, 5842 (1970 & Supp. V, 1975). For a brief discussion of
the act and its effects see note 2 supra.
149. 42 U.S.C. § 5801(b) (Supp. V, 1975).
150. It is noteworthy that the public works appropriation bill for fiscal year 1977,
approved by both houses of Congress but not enacted into law by the close of the 1976
session, reflects an ERDA budget authority of $7,100,934,000 of which over $5 billion
related directly to nuclear energy programs. H.R. 13350, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
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The Energy Resources Council was established to aid the development of this comprehensive energy program.' 5 1 By statute the council

is composed of the secretary of the interior, the administrator of the
FEA, the administrator of the ERDA, the secretary of state, the director of the Office of Management and Budget, "and such other officials of the Federal Government as the president may designate."' 52
The council is designed to coordinate the activities of the various

agencies with jurisdiction over energy matters toward the end of
fostering an integrated regulatory program reflecting the evolving
national energy policy.' 53 The council, however, was designed only las
a temporary measure; its existence terminates with the "enactment of

a permanent department responsible for energy and natural resources
or two years after such effective date, whichever shall occur first."' 5 4

Only a short time after enactment of the Energy Reorganization
Act of 1974, Congress took another major step toward establishing a
national energy policy by enlarging the ERDA mandate through the
Federal Non-Nuclear Energy Research and Development Act of 1974,
which established a nonnuclear research and development program administered by ERDA. 55
As promising as these congressional steps in 1974 seemed, however, a review of what has since transpired indicates that further effort
is necessary. On January 30, 1975, the President presented to Con-

gress proposed legislation for an "Energy Independence Act of 1975."
In essence a set of both new proposals and amendments to existing acts,
largely directed toward reducing dependence on foreign oil, the pro151. 42 U.S.C. § 5818 (Supp. V, 1975).
152. id. § 5818(a). To date, nineteen members have been added to the council.
See Exec. Order No. 11, 855, 3A C.F.R. 157 (1975); Exec. Order No. 11,819, 3A
C.F.R. 201 (1974); Exec. Order No. 11,814, 3A C.F.R. 197 (1974).
153. See Exec. Order No. 11,814 3A C.F.R. 197 (1974).
154. 42 U.S.C. § 5818(d) (Supp. V, 1975). On April 28, 1976, a bill was introduced before the Senate which would establish the Department of Energy and Natural
Resources, encompassing all of the present activities of the Department of the Interior,
ERDA and FEA, except those pertaining to regulation. The Secretary of Energy and
Natural Resources would have full responsibility over national energy programs. S. 3339,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). At the close of the 1976 session, the bill was still in the
Committee on Government Operations. It has been used as a working draft for the
proposed Energy Reorganization Act, S. 826, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977). See text
accompanying note 174 infra.
155. 42 U.S.C. H9 5901-17 (Supp. V, 1975). Congress reaffirmed the policies and
provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as part of a comprehensive national program, stating that "the policies and provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 ...
shall continue to apply to the nuclear research, development, and demonstration program." Id. § 5902(b) (2).
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posed act also included a proposed "Energy Facilities Planning and
Development Act of 1975. " 15" This Planning and Development Act,
while primarily limited in scope to siting, would nonetheless have provided the kind of workable priorities necessary to insure the realization
of a truly unified, truly comprehensive national energy program; it
would have given the FEA the same broad powers over development of
energy facilities which ERDA presently enjoys with respect to research
and development programs.
The proposed act contained four major and five minor provisions.
The minor provisions encompassed the encouragement of interstate
compacts for energy facility siting and approval, the maintenance of
federal preemption under the Atomic Energy Act, the judicial review
of final agency orders, and general authorization for the FEA administrator regulations necessary and proper under the act. 15 7 The first
major provision would have required the FEA administrator to submit
to both the president and to Congress, within one year, a national
energy site and facility report "analyz[ing] short and long term energy needs and demand[ing] and indicat[ing] the number, type and
general location of energy facilities required to meet national energy
objectives."'' 8 The second major provision likewise would have
required each state to submit to the FEA within one year of the
administrator's report "an energy facility management program for long
term energy facility planning and the achievement of energy production
needs by the expeditious consideration and processing of applications
to site, construct, and operate energy facilities . . ... "' The FEA administrator would have been empowered to promulgate an interim state
program in the absence of an approved state-submitted program. 16 0 A
third major provision authorized the administrator to award matching
grants to the states to assist the development of their programs.' 6' The
fourth major provision would have partially restructured the federal licensing process in an attempt "to coordinate, simplify, and expedite the
156. S. 594, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). See also S. 619, S. 984, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1975). Reference in this article to the proposed Energy Facilities Planning
and Development Act of 1975 will be directed to Title VIII of S. 594, which contains
the language originally proposed, and not the final version as embodied in S. 619 and
S. 984.
157. S. 594, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., tit. VIII, §§ 806, 808-11 (1975).
158. Id.§ 803(a).
159. Id.§ 804(a).
160. Id.§ 804(i).
161.

Id. § 805(b), (c).
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processing of applications to construct energy facilities."' 162 It authorized the FEA, in cooperation with a lead agency designated by the
FEA, to "supervise the overall federal approval process" and to
develop a "single composite application" to serve as the sole application
necessary for all federal agencies.16 3 It would also have established
an eighteen month time limit for federal agency application decisions,"' and mandated unified public hearings to the extent feasible. 1 65
The congressional response to the Energy Independence Act of
1975 is embodied in the Energy Policy and Conservation Act enacted
into law on December 22, 1975,166 which unfortunately falls far short
of the broad program envisioned by the Energy Independence Act, and
more particularly by the Energy Facilities Planning and Development
Act of 1975. The Energy Policy and Conservation Act appears to represent yet another piecemeal measure designed more to make specific
short term modifications in existing programs than to establish a comprehensive energy policy, belying the broad purposes recited in the 1974
congressional enactments.
The Energy Policy and Conservation Act essentially provided for
an energy data base, a petroleum pricing policy, various energy conservation measures including automobile and consumer product labeling,
strategic petroleum reserves, incentives for reducing domestic energy
consumption, and standby emergency powers for the executive branch.
A comparison of the proposal and the final product thus reveals that
the act incorporated few of the items originally envisioned by the
Energy Independence Act proposal.1 67 More important, it contains
none of the plans for the establishment of policies and procedures proposed by the Energy Facilities Planning and Development Act of
1975.168
162. Id. § 807(a).
163. Id. § 807(a), (b).
164. Id. § 807(f).
165. Id. § 807(c)(5).
166. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6201-422 (Supp. V, 1975).
167. Compare S. 594, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., tits. I, II, XII, XIII (1975), with 42
U.S.C. §§ 6201-422 (Supp. V, 1975).
168. S. 984, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).

Inasmuch as the proposed Energy

Facilities Planning and Development Act of 1975 represented a significant step forward
with respect to a national energy program, its present status deserves mention. The
act was incorporated into Senator Jackson's land use bill minus federal preemption sections. The Land Resources Planning Assistance Act was referred to the Interior Committee, where it remained at the close of the last session. S. 984, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975).
When the land use bill was killed in the House, the act's sections pertaining to
long range planning and use of coordinated application forms were incorporated, in
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Moreover, 1976 proved to be little more productive than 1975 toward producing substantive, comprehensive energy legislation. The
Energy Conservation and Production Act' 69 for example, simply extended the life of the FEA, provided for a program to develop improvements in electric utility rate design, promulgated energy conservation
performance standards in new buildings, and established a program to
assist in retrofitting existing buildings to improve energy conservation.
At least one step toward consolidating piecemeal energy regulations was
taken, however, in the act's establishment of -the Office of Energy
Information and Analysis within the FEA, the purpose of which is to
170
develop a National Energy Information System.
Two other bills were referred to the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy during the 94th Congress. The Nuclear Fuel Assurance Act
of 1976,171 designed to encourage private entry into the uranium enrichment field through cooperative agreements with the ERDA, passed
the House on August 4, 1976, but was never brought to a vote in the
Senate. While the bill did not contribute to the development of a comprehensive national energy program, it did reaffirm the importance of
nuclear energy in national energy policy. The revised Nuclear Facility
Siting and Licensing Act 1 72 was, as its name suggested, designed to expedite nuclear facility licensing. The bill failed, however, to move in
any significant way toward a workable formulation of a comprehensive
policy. Similarly, while the Energy Independence Authority Act of
1975 171 would have established a government corporation with the
power to enter into various arrangements for financing of energy facilities, it did not move toward establishing policies, programs, or priorities. All three bills described above died in committee.
The Carter administration has proposed an energy reorganization
174
bill,
which was introduced in the Senate by the Chairman of the
Committee on Intergovernmental Affairs, Senator Abraham Ribicoff.
This committee, which has jurisdiction over matters relating to the organization of federal agencies, is holding extensive hearings on the bill.
modified form, into the Electric Utility Regulatory Reform Bill, S. 2502, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1975). Hearings were held before the Committee on Commerce, but no
action was taken on the bill.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Pub. L. 94-385 (Aug. 14, 1976).
Id. §§ 51-59.
H.R. 8401, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
S. 3286, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).

173.
174.

S. 2532, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
S. 826, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
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The proposed Energy Reorganization Act would create a cabinet level
Department of Energy, combining the ERDA, the FEA, the FPC, and
certain functions of other agencies, including the Departments of the
Interior, HUD, and Commerce.
It is evident that governmental reorganization alone will not of itself effect the creation of a comprehensive national energy policy. Such
a policy may be forthcoming when President Carter reads his comprehensive energy proposal to Congress in April, however. While the
substance of that policy will certainly influence Congressional support
for the proposed department of energy, with the control of Congress
in the hands of the same political party for the first time since energy
became recognized as a national crisis, broad energy proposals such as
those of the Carter administration should fare better than their predecessors under earlier administrations.
The conclusion necessarily follows that while a national energy policy does indeed exist, it is neither comprehensive nor coordinated; at
present its thread is discernable only in random legislation. Looking
at the foregoing programs and mechanisms, however, one can speculate
upon why a more specific formulation of the national energy policy has
failed. Congress has apparently abdicated its responsibility for policy
formulation to various advisory bodies. The FEA, for example, with
the exception of a few specific programs, gathers and analyzes data
which it then passes on to the executive and legislative branches. With
the assistance of the Energy Resources Council, the FEA in turn formulates an energy plan and submits it to Congress. Congress then proceeds to enact individual sections on a random basis, neither looking
to the development of a comprehensive, integrated program, nor assigning priorities among competing programs.
The role given the ERDA, on the other hand, is in sharp contrast
to the role of the FEA. The ERDA has been granted a truly comprehensive mandate. Congress has delegated to the ERDA the power
both to assess priorities and to establish research and development programs in keeping with those priorities, and has further provided the
criteria for doing so. In the limited context of research and development, then, the ERDA mandate embodies what is needed for effectuation of a national energy policy in general: clear guidance and the
power to act.
The establishment of a Department of Energy and Natural Resources would be a positive step in resolving the problems which stem
from the lack of a comprehensive national energy policy, provided that
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Congress include in its delegation both a clear statement of the national
energy policy and criteria for establishing priorities among competing
federal policies and programs. Congress must furthermore officially
strike the balance between energy and environmental concerns. Responsibility for establishing such a balance is currently delegated to the
agencies, subject to judicial review. The court in Citizens for Safe
Power, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 75 expressly recognized
this need to balance the competing interests:
The weighing of risks against benefits in view of the circumstances of particular projects is required by NEPA in view of AEA.
The two statutes and the regulations
promulgated under each must
76
be viewed in para materia.'
In reviewing agency cost-benefit determinations, courts must be
guided by the statutory purpose and legislative delineation of an
agency's authority and discretion. This requires application of the
"rational basis" and "arbitrary and capricious" tests. 17'r Agencies and
courts which must operate in the absence of legislative guidance are
forced to litigate priorities on a case-by-case basis as opposed to
weighing the costs and benefits of a particular project against congressionally predefined priorities. Similarly, the department itself must be
given the power to establish priorities among competing programs
under its authority. In this respect, the approach suggested by the proposed Energy Facilities Planning and Development Act may be appropriate; requiring the states to submit energy programs in compliance
with department policy and programs is a necessity.
More important, once policies and priorities are established, coordination of effort requires that the department be preemptively empowered to supervise all aspects of facility licensing and approval. This
necessarily implies the use of a single application form and a coordinated hearing procedure. While some members of the industry have
suggested adoption of a one-step approach similar to that utilized in
several states, 78 a lead agency approach would appear preferable.
While the designation of a lead agency in all likelihood would
be left to the FEA under the proposed Energy Facilities Planning and
Development Act, it would seem more appropriate that the regulatory
175.

524 F.2d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1975).

176.

Id. at 1299.

177.

Cf. Scientists Inst. for Pub. Information, Inc. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079, 1095

n.68 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
178. A good example of this approach is the Energy Facilities Plant Site Evaluation
Council of the state of Washington. Wash. Rev. Code § 80.50 (Supp. 1975).
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agency specifically responsible for approving a given type of facility
should function as the lead agency. In the case of nuclear facility licensing, for example, the NRC should serve as the lead agency; in
hydroelectric facility licensing the Federal Power Commission should
take the lead. Rather than simply ushering -the applicant through the
myriad interested federal agencies, the lead agency alone, as the
agency which must make the ultimate cost-benefit determination,
should be empowered to make the final determination respecting the
application of priorities to any particular facility.' 7 9 Finally, in keeping
with the lead agency and national policy concepts, the doctrine of preemption should be applied so that state determinations which conflict
with the lead agency's final decision will yield. Such a course of action
would not necessarily and absolutely foreclose states from acting within
their spheres of interests, 180 but it would reserve to the appropriate
federal agency sole responsibility for final cost-benefit determinations
respecting particular facilities. The federal agency would apply congressionaliy defined priorities to the facts in each case, relying upon
the courts to review agency action for abuse of discretion and correctness of the determination in light of statutory purpose. 8 ' State
action precedent to final agency determination would be factored into
its decision and would be foreclosed only when in direct conflict with
the final determination.' 8 2 The NRC would, for example, continue its
present policy of incorporating state imposed limitations as license conditions when legitimately within the state's sphere of interests.' 83 While
all interests must be accommodated, responsibility -for a final determi179. Such an approach is consistent with Calvert Cliffs'. As the court pointed out:
"Certifying agencies do not attempt to weigh that damage against the opposing benefits.
Thus the balancing analysis remains to be done. It may be that the environmental
costs, though passing prescribed standards, are nonetheless great enough to outweigh the
particular economic and technical benefits involved in the planned action. The only
agency in a position to make such a judgment is the agency with overall responsibility
for the proposed federal action-the agency to which NEPA is specifically directed."
Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1123 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
180. See notes 76-85 & accompanying text supra.
181. See notes 86-91 & accompanying text supra.
182. It must be kept in mind that state action with respect to health and safety
issues is foreclosed especially where a higher standard of safety would be imposed. See
notes 74-78 & accompanying text supra.
183. See, e.g., Power Authority of N.Y., 7 A.E.C. 45 (1974); Delmarva Power &
Light Co., 2 N.R.C. 215, 248 (1975) (incorporation of state imposed conditions respecting chlorine concentrations and monitoring of effects on fish species pursuant to its
issuance of a FWPCA water quality certification).
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nation must rest with the appropriate agency, and in the case of nuclear
4
energy, this agency is the NRC.1
A proper mandate coupled with the mechanisms outlined above
could make a comprehensive and ordered energy policy a reality. In
the interim, administrative and judicial bodies can take the initiative
to accord greater weight to the existence of an expressed national
energy policy.
Conclusion
The NRC has in the past few years become the victim of lowest
common denominator thinking. This is reflected in both its delay
plagued proceedings and in certain questionable decisions from the
bench. As sluggishness has degenerated to the level of paralysis, however, the agency's functions have all but come to a standstill. Perhaps
the single most crucial cause of this paralysis is the lack of guidance of
the commission by Congress and the courts; lacking such guidance the
NRC's functions can only remain in a state of torpor pending the impact
of decisions from other quarters. This is not to say that the NRC could
not itself immediately effectuate reforms to speed up licensing and to
present an affirmative program to Congress to change statutory restrictions such as the mandatory hearings and the discriminatory antitrust
review requirements. Nevertheless the NRC, like its predecessor, has
followed a cautious line.
Any solution to the energy dilemma requires decisive action by
all of the actors-Congress, the courts, the agencies, and the NRC. For
its part, Congress must set forth the prescribed role of nuclear energy
in its overall national energy policy and set regulatory priorities both
within the energy framework itself and between the energy policy and
other conflicting federal policies. It must then design mechanisms
which will work in harmony to meet the ends of that policy. The courts
should take it upon themselves to lend decisional recognition to the
energy policy which currently exists and to such energy programs as
Congress may promulgate in the future. They should extend support
to the various agencies within the scheme, assigning due weight to de184.

"[Flhrough direction of the licensing scheme for nuclear reactors, Congress

vested the AEC with the authority to resolve the proper balance between desired industrial progress and adequate health and safety standards. Only through the application and enforcement of uniform standards promulgated by a national agency will these
dual objectives be assured." Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143,

1153-54 (8th Cir. 1971 ).
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terminations made by the licensing agencies, which must bear the ultimate responsibility for cost-benefit analyses under NEPA. Finally,
the NRC must recognize its responsibilities in any national energy
scheme and must aggressively pursue the duties and responsibilities it
has been given.
In short, these characters in the nuclear drama can no longer linger
at the parapets awaiting ghostly guidance. 18 5 Action is required in
order that the NRC may serve the regulatory and licensing functions
for which it was intended.
185.

Cf. W. SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, Act I, sc. i, lines 140-58.

